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The relation between productivity level and the mode of organi-
zation remains on unsolved puzzle in international trade theory. As
pointed out by Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), while some studies in-
dicate that low productivity ￿rms choose to outsource, other studies
have derived results to the contrary. This paper attempts to solve the
puzzle by taking into account the imperfections of ￿nancial markets.
If the enforcement level of the ￿nancial market in the South country is
low, only low productivity ￿rms choose outsourcing in the South. On
the other hand, if the enforcement level is su¢ ciently high in the South
country, high productivity ￿rms choose outsourcing in the South and
low productivity ￿rms choose integration in the North country. Thus,
we demonstrate that the di⁄erence in the empirical results of previous
studies arises from the di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial imperfections in the
host country. Furtheremore, we extend this model to a multi-country
model.
Key Words: Outsourcing, Organization, FDI, Financial Imperfec-
tion, Imperfect Enforcement.
JEL Classi￿cation: F10, F23, F36, G28, G32
1 Introduction
This paper demonstrates that ￿nancial imperfections or imperfect enforce-
ment in the ￿nancial markets of host countries is an important factor in
understanding outsourcing decisions in the South countries. The relation
￿The author thanks Taiji Frusawa, Jyota Ishikawa, and seminar participants at Hitot-
subashi University.
1between productivity level and the mode of organization remains unsolved
puzzle in international trade theory. Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), the sem-
inal paper in this ￿eld, mentioned, for example, that ￿[t]his sorting pat-
tern di⁄ers from the sorting pattern derived by Grossman and Helpman
(in press)1 for organizational structures...Empirical evidence is needed to
discriminate between them￿ (p 570). Although many empirical papers have
been published that examine the behaviors of multinational ￿rms2, we do
not have a clear answer to this puzzle as yet. It remains unclear why two dif-
ferent theories and empirical results coexist. This paper endeavors to unify
the two contrasting results and solve the puzzle by taking into account the
imperfections of ￿nancial markets.
Recently, several papers have focused on the imperfections of ￿nancial
markets and international trade. For example, Matsuyama (2005) has fo-
cused on the roles of corporate governance or contract enforcement under
imperfect credit market conditions and examined how these factors a⁄ect
the patterns of international trade. Antr￿s and Caballero (2007) has ex-
amined the relation between international capital ￿ ow and international
trade by taking into account the imperfections of ￿nancial markets. Antr￿s
and Caballero (2007) have demonstrated that in less ￿nancially developed
economies, trade and capital mobility are complementary. Moreover, the pa-
per has revealed that trade liberalization always decreases the wage-rental
ratio in the South. Manova (2008) has examined the e⁄ects of credit con-
straints on international capital ￿ ows. Manova (2008) has indicated that
￿nancially developed countries are more likely to export bilaterally and ship
greater volumes when they become exporters.3 Thus, it has been recognized
that the existence of imperfections in ￿nancial markets is an important ele-
ment in the elaboration of international trade theory. However, the relation
between imperfect ￿nancial markets and the choice of organization structure
has not been examined intensively.4 Hence, the present paper focuses on this
aspect and demonstrates that the degree of imperfection in the ￿nancial
market of the host country is crucial for the realized mode of organization.
In general, ￿nancial contracts constitute a coordination device for agents.
1This paper was published as Grossman and Helpman (2004).
2For example, Yeaple (2006) and Tomiura (2007). An excellent survey paper concerning
this ￿eld is Bernard et al. (forthcoming).
3Other papers are Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Beck (2002), Chaney(2005), Ju and Wei
(2005), Becker and Greenberg (2005), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005), and Wynne (2005).
4Antras et al.(2006) and Chor et al.(2008) examined the behavior of multinational
￿rms and ￿nancial imperfections. However, since these paper did not examine the choice
of organization mode, their purposes di⁄er from the purpose of this paper.
2If the ￿nancial system is imperfect, coordination among agents becomes im-
perfect, and this imperfection a⁄ects the choice of organization modes. We
show that if the ￿nancial market is less developed and the enforcement level
is low in a South country, low productivity ￿rms choose outsourcing in the
South. This result is consistent with the result of Grossman and Helpman
(2004). On the other hand, if the enforcement level is su¢ ciently high in the
South country, high productivity ￿rms choose outsourcing in the South and
low productivity ￿rms choose the integration in the North country. This
result is consistent with the result in Antr￿s and Helpman (2004). Thus,
we reveal that the di⁄erence in the empirical results of the previous studies
arises as a result of the di⁄erent degree of ￿nancial imperfection in the host
country. Why is imperfection of the ￿nancial market such a crucial element?
An intuitive reason is as follows. If a ￿nancial market is less developed, it is
di¢ cult for a ￿nal-good producer to absorb the ex post gain from the South
through the use of ￿nancial transfers. Hence, the outsourcing￿ which leads
to the South enjoying higher bargaining power￿ is not a good strategy for
productive ￿nal-good producers.
This result is consistent with empirical observations. For example, Gross-
man and Helpman (2004) referred to an empirical analysis by Lin and Png
(2003) as evidence that supports their theory. The empirical test by Lin and
Png (2003) examined the behavior of Taiwanese ￿rms with respect to the
period from 1987 to 1991, with China as the targeted host country. Hence,
it appears that Lin and Png (2003) dealt with the case of less developed
￿nancial markets. Aw and Lee (2008), in a recent empirical analysis, also
examined Taiwanese ￿rms￿foreign direct investments (FDIs) in China, and
its results are more consistent with those of Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) and
Helpman et al. (2004)5. Aw and Lee (2008) used the ￿rm-level data in 2000.
In the 90s, the Chinese economy had grown up and the ￿nancial market had
developed. Hence, Aw and Lee (2008) dealt with a more developed ￿nancial
market as compared with Lin and Png (2003). Marin (2006) has explored
that because of the improvements in the contracting environment in East-
ern Europe, outsourcing is increasing; however, ￿rms prefer o⁄shoring over
outsourcing when the cost of holdup is high. Moreover, McKendrick et al.
(2000) has illustrated as an example, that bigger and more productive ￿rms
are choosing to outsource more complicated productions such as the man-
5Aw and Lee (2008) have shown that less productive ￿rms choose the integration
strategy. Of course, the data set in Aw and Lee (2008) is di⁄erent from that used in
Lin and Png (2003), and Aw and Lee (2008) did not examine the di⁄erence between
outsourcing and FDI. Hence, the results in Aw and Lee (2008) and Lin and Png (2003)
are not necessarily contradictory.
3ufacture of HDD drives provided the institutional environment of the host
country is improved.
In order to clarify this point, we extend the model of Antr￿s and Help-
man (2004). In order to focus on imperfection in the ￿nancial market, we
assume that the manufacturing sector does not have initial wealth and that
it has to borrow from outside investors to pay the up-front payments or
setup costs. However, the manufacturing sector is ￿nancially constrained
and it is di¢ cult for them to borrow a su¢ cient amount even if the sector
will get positive pro￿ts in the future. Instead, we assume that the level
of ￿xed costs is independent of organization structure. Antr￿s and Help-
man (2004) crucially assumed that the ￿xed cost payment depends upon
the organization structure. Hence, in their model, the choice of organiza-
tion structure is crucially a⁄ected by the assumption of a relative amount
of ￿xed costs. In this paper, we assume that the ￿xed cost is independent
of the organization mode. We can show that even under this assumption,
the mode of organization is dependent on the productivity level of the ￿rm.
The argument of this paper is in line with the literature examining het-
erogenous productivity and international trade. There exist many important
empirical papers including pioneer papers such as Bernard and Jensen (1995)
(1997). Bernard et al. (2008) is a survey paper on the empirical analyses
conducted in this ￿eld. Melitz (2003) is a seminal theoretical paper, while
Helpman (2006) is a review of the important papers in this ￿eld. In addi-
tion, Nunn and Tre￿ er (2008) examined the behavior of multinational ￿rms
by considering the heterogenous productivity of each ￿rm.
This paper contributes to the new research topic emphasizing the impor-
tance of infrastructure or institutional environments in international trade
considerations. Nunn (2007) has shown that countries with good contract
enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-
speci￿c investments. Bernard et al. (2008) is concerned with the enforce-
ment of trade contracts. It has demonstrated that intra-￿rm trade is high
for the products with low levels of contractibility. Yeaple and Golub (2007)
examined the e⁄ect of infrastructure provision on industry-level productivity
and international specialization. Levchenko (2007) stressed on institutional
di⁄erences as a source of comparative advantage. Chor et al. (2007) ex-
amined how the level of ￿nancial development in host countries a⁄ects the
spatial distribution of the sales of multinational corporations (MNCs).
In section 2, we present a basic model of this paper, and in section 3,
we derive the optimal bargaining power of ￿nal-good producers when they
can choose any level of ex post bargaining power. In section 4, we examine
the choice of organization modes both when the enforcement level in the
4South is low and when it is high. In section 5, we examine a multi-country
model, and in section 6, we introduce the possibility of FDIs. In section 7,
we conclude the paper and mention some extensions.
2 Model
Consider a world with one North country and one South country. (We
extend this model to a multi-country model in a subsequent section.) A
unique factor of production is labor, and all consumers worldwide have an
identical preference that is given by













; 0 < ￿ < 1; (2)
and x0 is the consumption level of the numeraire good. In addition,
Xj is an index of aggregate consumption in sector j, and ￿ is a parameter.
Moreover, xj(i) is the consumption level of variety i in sector j, and the
range of i will be determined endogenously. The elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties in a given sector is 1=(1￿￿), and we assume ￿ > ￿
as conventionally assumed in the related literature. Under the standard
assumptions concerning the monopolistic competition setting, we can derive













; 0 < ￿j < 1: (4)
Here, we assume that production requires two speci￿c investments￿ hj(i)
for headquarter services and mj(i) for manufactured components. Under the
5demand function and the production function, the revenue function Rj(i) =










Hereafter, since we focus solely on industry j, and thus we omit the sub-
script j from the remaining notations. As assumed in Antr￿s and Helpman
(2004) or Helpman (2006), the ￿nal-good producers, H, who supply head-
quarter services enter into contracts with the operators of manufacturing
plants, M, who supply intermediate inputs. The sequence of the game is as
follows. At date 0, a ￿nal-good producer, H, contracts with the operator of
a manufacturing plant, M. As generally assumed in the related literature,
we assume that there are many potential operators ex ante and that H has
strong bargaining power over M at this time. Moreover, H must pay the
setup cost of the plant, wT, at date 0. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
setup cost wT is exogenously given and is independent of the organization
structure or the location of the plant. Of course, H may be able to negotiate
with M to share a portion of the setup cost. The negotiation process will
be explained subsequently. At the beginning of date 1, h and m are chosen,
and the costs for h and m and the ￿xed costs of production should be paid.
Then, the ￿nal goods are produced and sold to consumers.
First, we examine the ex post sharing rule of pro￿t. Since we employ the
standard incomplete contracts approach, it is impossible to write complete
contracts specifying any future complex contingency. Thus, after choosing
h(i) and m(i), the two parties negotiate about the sharing of the ex post
bene￿t. The bargaining power for the ex post negotiation is a⁄ected by the
parties￿organization structures. We will examine the optimal organization
structure below.
We assume here that R is divided into ￿R and (1 ￿ ￿)R and that ￿ is
determined by the chosen organization structure. Under the sharing rule,
each party maximizes the following problems.
Max h ￿R ￿ wh ￿ wkf; (6)
Max m (1 ￿ ￿)R ￿ wm ￿ w(1 ￿ k)f; (7)
where wkf and w(1￿k)f are the ￿xed costs that H and M have to pay,
respectively. We assume here that the total ￿xed cost, wf, is independent
6of the organization structure. Thus, H has to pay wkf and M has to pay
w(1 ￿ k)f. Moreover, k is a ￿xed parameter and depends on the place of
operation as will be explained below. Of course, this is an extreme situation.
The purpose of this assumption is to show that even though the total ￿xed
cost is irrelevant to the outsourcing decision, there will be heterogenous
choices in organization structure. This point is in contrast to the result
of Antr￿s and Helpman (2004). Under the setting of Antr￿s and Helpman
(2004), the ￿xed cost is dependent upon the organization structure, and the
level of ￿xed cost is crucial for the optimal organization choice. Furthermore,
we simply assume that the ￿xed cost is measured by the wage rate of the
North. Our argument is not a⁄ected even though we change this assumption.
From the maximization problems, the equilibrium revenue R￿, which












wh￿ = ￿￿￿R￿; (9)
wm￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)R￿: (10)
Hence, at date 1, H can expect to obtain
gH = ￿R￿ ￿ wh￿ ￿ wkf (11)
= (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿R￿ ￿ wkf;
and M can expect to obtain
gM = (1 ￿ ￿)R￿ ￿ wlm￿ ￿ w(1 ￿ k)f (12)
= (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)R￿ ￿ w(1 ￿ k)f:
7Next, we examine the negotiation over the payment of the setup cost wT.
Since the ￿nal-good producer can expect the allocation of pro￿t to be be
determined in the manner explained above, at date 0, H may request M to
share the setup cost payment, t. Theoretically, this payment corresponds to
the ￿xed up-front payment that M has to pay to H. We have assumed here
that H has 100% bargaining power at date 0, as assumed in the literature.
Hence, this t is used to absorb the ex post gain of M; that is, gM. Even
if M can expect to obtain gM at date 1, it may not have su¢ cient cash at
date 0. Hence, the amount of costs that the manufacturing plant can pay
at date 0 is dependent upon the ￿nancial condition of the country to which
M belongs. We will examine this point more carefully below.
(a) Perfect ￿nancial market
If M has a su¢ cient amount of assets, t will be set as t = gM to absorb
all of M￿s ex post gain. In this situation, the ex ante expected gain of the
￿nal-good producer becomes
￿￿ ￿ gH + t ￿ wT = gH + gM ￿ wT
= R￿ ￿ wh￿ ￿ wm￿ ￿ wf ￿ wT: (13)
This situation is consistent with that of AntrÆs and Helpman (2004),
since the latter held the assumption that H uses the up-front payment to
absorb all of M￿positive gain. In this situation, H can supply the product
so long as ￿￿ ￿ 0.
The pro￿t of each ￿nal producer whose productivity level is ￿ can be
written as
￿￿(￿) = R￿(￿) ￿ wh￿(￿) ￿ wm￿(￿) ￿ w(f + T) (14)
= [1 ￿ ￿f￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)g]R￿(￿) ￿ w(f + T):
We de￿ne ￿￿ as the cuto⁄ level of the productivity where ￿￿(￿￿) = 0. In
other words, ￿rms whose productivity is ￿ ￿ ￿￿ can supply the product.
However, we assume that the operators of manufacturing plants have no
initial wealth and must borrow to make the up-front payment t. Even so,
H can absorb t = gM if the ￿nancial market is perfect, since it is possible
for M to borrow gM.
8(b) Imperfect ￿nancial market
If the ￿nancial market is imperfect, however, M is only able to borrow
an amount less than gM. Given this situation, the ￿nal-good producer must
set the up-front payment as less than gM, even though H has the ex ante
bargaining power.
We assume that the manufacturing sector can borrow to pay a maximum
up-front payment of
t￿(￿;￿) = ￿gM; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1: (15)
Here, ￿ is the degree of imperfection in the ￿nancial market. There
are various reasons why ￿ becomes less than 1 (see Matsuyama, 2005, or
Antr￿s and Caballero, 2007). As Matsuyama (2005) mentions, ￿[i]t is pos-
sible to give any number of agency stories to justify the assumption￿ (P.715,
fn1), such as the moral hazard opportunity of the manufacturing sector or
strategic default possibilities. Here we simply assume that the problem of
imperfect enforcement exists in the ￿nancial market. Consequently, while
lenders can expect the manufacturing sector to earn gM, it is impossible to
capture the entire amount since the enforcement mechanism is imperfect.
Thus, lenders can expect to recover (under any contracts) at most ￿gM and
lend at maximum ￿gM.
Under the imperfect enforcement situation, the ￿nal-good producer￿ s
pro￿t ￿(￿;￿) becomes as follows.
￿ = gH + t￿ ￿ wT = gH + ￿gM ￿ wT (16)
= (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿R￿ ￿ wkf + ￿ f(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)R￿ ￿ w(1 ￿ k)fg ￿ wT
= [￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)g]R￿ ￿ fk + ￿(1 ￿ k)gwf ￿ wT:
However, we should be careful because gM might be negative even when
￿ is positive. If gM is negative, the lump-sum transfer t should be negative.
In other words, the ￿nal-good producer is required to compensate for the
negative pro￿t of the manufacturing sector in order to realize production.
In such cases, the imperfect enforcement problem is irrelevant so long as the
￿nal-good producer has su¢ cient wealth. In order to examine this point
more carefully, we de￿ne the following threshold levels.
Let us de￿ne e ￿ as the cuto⁄ level of ￿, that is, ￿(e ￿) = 0, and ￿M as
the cuto⁄ level of gM, that is, gM(￿M) = 0. If e ￿ ￿ ￿M, we need not be
concerned with the possibility of a negative gM. Since gM is an increasing
function of ￿; gM(￿) ￿ 0 falls in the range of ￿ ￿ e ￿: On the other hand,
9if e ￿ < ￿M; H ￿ whose productivity is smaller than ￿M￿ compensates for
its negative pro￿t, that is, gM. Hence, gH + t￿ = gH + gM = ￿￿. In other
words, the threshold productivity level becomes ￿￿ if e ￿ < ￿M:
Pursuing this more rigorously, we get the following Lemma.








[￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)g]R￿
￿fk + ￿(1 ￿ k)gwf ￿ wT ￿ 0
if e ￿ ￿ ￿
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[￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)g]R￿
￿fk + ￿(1 ￿ k)gwf ￿ wT > 0
if ￿ ￿ ￿M
[1 ￿ ￿f￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)g]R￿(￿)
￿wf ￿ wT > 0
if ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿M
0 if ￿ < ￿￿
Proof. Since ￿ is an increasing function of ￿; e ￿ ￿ ￿M, and we need not have
to be concerned with a negative gM provided ￿(￿M) ￿ 0. On the other hand,
if ￿(￿M) > 0, then e ￿ < ￿M and ￿￿(￿) = [1￿￿f￿￿+(1￿￿)(1￿￿)g]R￿(￿)￿
wf ￿ wT > 0 for ￿￿ ￿ ￿M: Hence, we should examine check whether or
not ￿(￿M) > 0. From the de￿nition of gM, R￿(￿M) = 1￿k
(1￿￿+￿￿)(1￿￿)wf:








thus obtain the result.




and the cuto⁄ productivity level is e ￿. We can easily show that e ￿ is higher
than ￿￿ and that this gap is a decreasing function of the enforcement level
￿. In other words, less productive ￿rms must exit from the market if the
￿nancial market of the country is less developed. If the ￿nancial market is
developed and ￿ becomes su¢ ciently high, less productive ￿rms can survive
the market competition.
10Proposition 2 If T
f >
(1￿k)(1￿￿￿)￿￿k(1￿￿+￿￿)(1￿￿)
(1￿￿+￿￿)(1￿￿) , then e ￿ ￿ ￿￿ and e ￿ ￿￿￿
is a decreasing function of ￿.




(1￿￿+￿￿)(1￿￿) . Since ￿￿(e ￿) ￿ ￿(e ￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)gM(e ￿);
￿￿(e ￿) ￿ 0 and ￿￿(e ￿) is a decreasing function of ￿. This implies that e ￿ ￿ ￿￿
and that e ￿ ￿ ￿￿ is a decreasing function of ￿.
Here, we should mention the timing of payment t. The question arises
as to whether payment t can be made after production, then M does not
have to borrow t from the ￿nancial market, and the above argument returns
to the world of Antr￿s and Helpman (2004). Such intuition is not correct,
however, since M may not pay the exact promised payment after production.
In general, the late payment situation is corresponds to the case where the
￿nal-good producer H lends t to M until the end of production. Hence,
even if the lender is the ￿nal-good producer and not an outside investor, it
is di¢ cult for the lender to capture all of the gain so long as the ￿nancial
market is imperfect.
However, there exists a possibility that in the negotiation over the ￿nan-
cial payment, the ￿nal-good producer is a more powerful negotiator than
outside investors, since H has bargaining power over M with regard to the
sharing of R. In particular, in the case of vertical integration, H may have
more bargaining power than outside investors, and the enforcement level ￿
may become higher since H has the right to seize the assets of the man-
ufacturing sector. The existence of such a possibility does not a⁄ect our
argument because we have already assumed that ￿n > ￿s. However, when
we consider the possibility of FDI, it may be necessary to take into account
this point, and the enforcement level under FDI should be higher than that
under outsourcing at the South6. We will consider this case in a subsequent
section.
3 Optimal bargaining power
First, we examine the optimal ￿ given enforcement technology ￿. Al-
though we restrict the feasible ￿ in the subsequent explanation as Antr￿s
6This situation is closely related to the argument in Antr￿s et al. (2007).
11and Helpman (2004) have assumed, we ￿rst check the optimal ￿ when the
enforcement technology is given by the structure of the ￿nancial market.
The optimal ￿ given ￿ and ￿, ￿￿(￿;￿) is derived as follows.
￿￿(￿;￿) = ArgMax￿(￿;￿;￿): (17)
From the ￿rst order condition, ￿￿ should satisfy the condition
￿f1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)g￿2+
(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)f1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿(1 + ￿￿)g￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿) = 0; (18)
while the second-order condition is
￿2f1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)g￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)f1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿(1 + ￿￿)g ￿ 0:
(19)
When ￿ = 0, the ￿rst-order condition and second-order condition respec-
tively become
￿f1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)g￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿ = 0; (20)
￿2f1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)g￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0: (21)
Hence,
￿￿(￿;0) =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
: (22)
If ￿ = 1, it is evident that ￿￿ = 0, as explored by Antr￿s and Helpman
(2004). If ￿ < 1, however, ￿￿(￿;0) > 0. This implies that even if ￿ is su¢ -
ciently small, the ￿nal-good producer should not accord all the bargaining
power to the manufacturing sector. An intuitive reason is as follows. When
the ￿nancial market is perfect, the ￿nal-good producer can absorb the ex
post rent of M through the up-front payment. Thus, the ￿nal-good producer
need not be concerned with the loss of bargaining power. When ￿ is suf-
￿ciently small, the incentive of the manufacturing sector is important, and
this indicates that it is better to allocate bargaining power to the manufac-
turing. On the other hand, if ￿ < 1, the ￿nal-good producer cannot absorb
the ex post rent of the manufacturing. Hence, it is not the best strategy for
12the ￿nal-good producer to allocate the bargaining power, and thus the ex
post rent, to the manufacturing.




Proposition 3 Provided ￿ < 1, ￿￿(￿;￿) > 0 and
@￿￿(￿;￿)
@￿ < 0 even if ￿ = 0.
Proof. Those are directly derived from (22) and (23).
This result deviates considerably from the result of Antr￿s and Helpman
(2004). The intuitive reason is as follows. Under the imperfect enforcement
problem, the ￿nal-good producer cannot absorb all the ex post rent that is
thus allocated to the manufacturing sector. Hence, it is not the best strat-
egy to allocate all the bargaining power to the manufacturing sector if the
￿nancial market is imperfect. However, this result is not inconsistent with
the empirical results that support Antr￿s (2003) and Antr￿s and Helpman
(2004). Those results (for example, Antr￿s, 2003; Yeaple, 2006; Nunn and
Tre￿ er, 2007) do not directly examine the cases where ￿ = 0. They have
tested, for example, the positive relationship between intra-￿rm trade shares
and headquarter service intensity.7 Moreover, even in our argument, ￿￿ is
an increasing function of ￿. Thus, our argument is not inconsistent with
the results. In order words, this result suggests that the e⁄ect might be
observed more clearly in empirical examinations that are more concerned
with the ￿nancial market condition of host countries.
When ￿ = 1; the ￿rst-order condition becomes
￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿2 + f1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)g￿ + ￿ = 0 (24)
while the second-order condition becomes
￿2(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 + ￿) ￿ 0: (25)
The best strategy is to choose ￿ = 1, since the feasible set of ￿ is
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Hence, this result is consistent with Antr￿s and Helpman
(2004).




when ￿ = 1. This implies that the ￿nal-good producer with a low ￿ is
required to compensate for the ex post negative pro￿t of the manufacturing
sector. Even so, ￿ = 1 is the optimal allocation of bargaining power, and
7Nunn and Tre￿ er (2007) called this e⁄ect the ￿Antr￿s e⁄ect￿ .
13the ￿nal-good producer should compensate for the ex post negative pro￿t.
The intuitive reason is simple. Even for such ￿nal-good producers, the pro￿t
after compensation is maximized at ￿ = 1, since the best strategy is ￿ = 1
even if ￿ = 1.
4 Organization Choice
Here, we compare vertical integration in the North and outsourcing in the
South. We assume here that
wn > ws, ￿n > ￿s, ￿n > ￿s, kn > ks. (26)
The above assumptions are natural in our setting. First, we assume
that the wage rate of the North is higher than that of the South. This is
a standard assumption in the literature. It is natural to assume that the
￿nancial market of the North is more e¢ cient than that of the South. Hence,
we assume that the enforcement level of the North, ￿n; is higher than that
of the South, that is, ￿s. The third assumption arises from the di⁄erence in
the organizational structure. As Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) have explored,
it is natural to assume that the bargaining power of the ￿nal-good producer
under the integration, ￿n, is higher than that under the outsourcing, that is,
￿s. Lastly, we assume that under the outsourcing, the manufacturing sector
is required to pay a relatively higher ￿xed cost, that is, kn > ks.
To examine the optimal organization structure, we rewrite the pro￿t
function as follows.
￿l(￿) = ￿lX(￿￿￿)=(1￿￿)￿￿=(1￿￿) ￿ Klwnf ￿ wnT; l = n;s; (27)
where
￿l =










Kl = kl + ￿l(1 ￿ kl): (29)
14If ￿n(￿) ￿ ￿s(￿) (and ￿n(￿) ￿ 0), a ￿nal-good producer with productiv-
ity ￿ chooses integration in the North. On the other hand, if ￿n(￿) < ￿s(￿)
(and ￿s(￿) ￿ 0), a ￿nal-good producer with productivity ￿ chooses out-
sourcing in the South. Moreover, if ￿n(￿) < 0 and ￿s(￿) < 0, a ￿nal-good
producer with productivity ￿ exits the market. Of course, ￿n(￿) and ￿s(￿)
are dependent upon ￿. We can easily see that ￿l and Kl are increasing
functions of ￿.
Here, we focus on ￿s, that is, the enforcement level of the South country.
Case(1) Low enforcement level
First, we examine the case where ￿s is su¢ ciently low and the following
conditions are satis￿ed.
￿s < ￿n (30)
and
Ks < Kn: (31)
Even if w > ws; the above inequality is satis￿ed as long as ￿s is su¢ -
ciently low.
We depict this situation in Figure 1. The South Outsourcing (SO) line
shows ￿s(￿) and the North Integration (NI) line shows ￿n(￿): Since ￿s is
low and the above two conditions are satis￿ed, NI line is steeper than the SO
line. Hence, as seen in Figure 1, low productivity ￿rms choose outsourcing
in the South while high productivity ￿rms choose integration in the North.













The ￿rms whose productivity is lower than ￿L will exit the market, and
the ￿rms whose ￿ is in the range of [￿L;￿M] will choose outsourcing in the
South. The ￿rms whose ￿ is higher than ￿M will choose integration in the
North.














choose integration in the North.
The situation is consistent with the results of Grossman and Helpman
(2004). If the enforcement technology of the south is su¢ ciently low, low
productivity ￿rms choose outsourcing. Since the enforcement level is low,
it is di¢ cult for ￿nal-good producers to absorb the ex post gain of the
manufacturing. On the other hand, this implies that the e⁄ective ￿xed cost
for ￿nal-good producers should decrease, since H has to pay only ￿s(1￿ks).
Hence, outsourcing is attractive for low productivity ￿rms; however, high
productivity ￿rms prefer integration.
Case(2) High enforcement level case
We now consider the case where ￿s is su¢ ciently high. In this case, the
organization structure may become quite di⁄erent. High productivity ￿rms
may choose outsourcing. To pursue this more rigorously, we consider the
case where ￿s is su¢ ciently high and the following conditions are satis￿ed.
￿s > ￿n (34)
and
Ks > Kn: (35)




￿s : This situ-
ation is presented in Figure 2. In this case the SO line is steeper than the
NI line and the tangent of the SO line is higher than that of the NI line.
Hence, as indicated in ￿gure 2 shows, only high productivity ￿rms choose













16The ￿rms whose productivity is lower than ￿l will exit the market while
the ￿rms whose ￿ is in the range of [￿l;￿m] will choose integration in the













This result is consistent with the result of Antr￿s and Helpman (2004).
However, we should stress that we have assumed the amount of ￿xed cost wf
to be independent of organization structure. This assumption is quite di⁄er-
ent from that of Antr￿s and Helpman (2004). They assumed that outsourc-
ing in the South requires high ￿xed cost, and thus, only high productivity
￿rms choose outsourcing. The result of this paper has demonstrated that
the assumption of Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) is not a necessary condition
for obtaining the above result.
Moreover, our results have solved the paradox concerning outsourcing
decisions. Here, we have established that the results of Grossman and Help-
man (2004) and Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) are not inconsistent. The
di⁄erence in their results arise from di⁄erences in the imperfections of ￿nan-
cial markets or di⁄erences of enforcement technology in ￿nancial markets. If
the ￿nancial market of the South is very imperfect, high productivity ￿rms
choose the integration strategy, and only low productivity ￿rms choose the
outsourcing strategy. This is the picture that Grossman and Helpman (2004)
have projected and is consistent with the empirical evidences that they cited.
Actually Grossman and Helpman (2004) assumed that ￿nal-good producers
do not use the up-front payments. This implies that they have implicitly
assumed the existence of some kinds of ￿nancial imperfection.
(3) Comparative Statics
In order to clarify the above argument, we examine some comparative
statics to derive more complete picture of the above argument. We examine
which type of organization pattern emerges when ￿s and ws change. As
explored in the above arguments, the crucial factors for the determination
of organization pattern are ￿ and K. Since K depends only on ￿ and does
not depend on w, let us de￿ne ￿s￿ as ￿s, which realizes Ks = Kn, that is,
ks + ￿s￿(1 ￿ ks) = kn + ￿n(1 ￿ kn):
17Hence, Ks is smaller (larger) than Kn if and only if ￿s is smaller (larger)
than ￿s￿. Next let de￿ne Ws
1(￿s) as the wage rate of the south ws which
realizes ￿s = ￿n given ￿s. Since @￿s=@ws < 0 and @￿s=@￿s > 0, we obtain
dWs
1=d￿s > 0. Similarly, let us de￿ne Ws






When ￿s = ￿s￿, Ks = Kn from the de￿nition of ￿s￿, and thus, ￿s must
be equal to ￿n for satisfying the above equation. Hence, we can state that
Ws
1(￿s￿) = Ws
2(￿s￿). Furthermore, if ￿s < ￿s￿, Ks is smaller than Kn, and
￿s must be smaller than ￿n for satisfying the above equation. This implies
Ws
1(￿s) is smaller than Ws
2(￿s), since @￿s=@ws < 0. On the other hand, if
￿s > ￿s￿, ￿s must be smaller than ￿n for satisfying the above equation, and
Ws
1(￿s) > Ws
2(￿s): In summary, we obtain the relations given below. These
relations are also summarized in Figure 3.
Ws
1(￿s) < Ws
2(￿s); if ￿s < ￿s￿;
Ws
1(￿s) > Ws
2(￿s); if ￿s > ￿s￿:
First, we examine the situation in which ￿s < ￿s￿, that is, Ks < Kn.
Obviously, if ￿s ￿ ￿n, all ￿rms choose outsourcing in the South. In other
words, if ws ￿ Ws
1(￿s), outsourcing becomes the optimal strategy for all





￿rms choose integration in the North. Hence, if ws ￿ Ws
2(￿s), integra-
tion becomes the optimal strategy for all ￿rms. Therefore, if Ws
2(￿s) ￿
ws ￿ Ws
1(￿s), low productivity ￿rms choose the South outsourcing strategy
and high productivity ￿rms choose the North integration strategy, that is,





Next, we examine the situation in which ￿s ￿ ￿s￿, that is, Ks ￿ Kn.
In this situation, all ￿rms choose integration in the North if ws ￿ Ws
2(￿s),
since ￿s becomes smaller than ￿n. On the other hand, if ws ￿ Ws
1(￿s),




￿n . Thus, if Ws
1(￿s) ￿ ws ￿ Ws
2(￿s), low productivity ￿rms choose
the North integration strategy and high productivity ￿rms choose the South
outsourcing strategy, that is, the Antr￿s = Helpman type situation is real-




￿n . These are summarized
in Figure 3.
185 Multi-country model
We can naturally extend the above argument to a multi-county model. Of
course many possibilities emerge with the extension of the above argument
to multi-country cases. Hence, we focus on a simple and interesting case.
In order to focus on di⁄erences in enforcement structures, we assume that
there is one North country and two South countries. The enforcement level
￿s1 and wage rate ws1 of one South country are low whereas those of the
other South country, that is ￿s2 and ws2, are high. We assume that
￿s1 < ￿s2 < ￿n; (38)
ws1 < ws2 < wn: (39)
The other aspects of these South countries remain the same.
￿l =










Kl = kl + ￿l(1 ￿ kl): (41)
Obviously ￿s1 < ￿s2 and Ks1 < Ks2. Hence, if ￿s1 < ￿n < ￿s2
and Ks1 < Kn < Ks2, we obtain the following clear separation. Low ￿
(￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2) ￿rms choose outsourcing in the South country with ￿, while
high ￿ ￿rms (￿3 ￿ ￿) choose outsourcing in the South country with high
￿. Only ￿rms with middle ￿ (￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3) choose integration in the North
country. This situation is consistent with the result derived by Grossman
and Helpman (2004). Figure 4 depicts this situation.
6 Possibility of FDI
In the previous sections, we have assumed that there are only two organi-
zation structures, namely integration in the North and outsourcing in the
South. In this section, we introduce another alternative, namely FDI. Even
19if we introduce the additional choice of FDI, the basic argument is not af-
fected. From the argument of the previous section, we understand that there
are two major di⁄erences between FDI (integration in the South) and out-
sourcing in the South: the ex post bargaining power ￿ and the enforcement
level ￿. Let us de￿ne ￿f as the bargaining power of H under the FDI
strategy and that ￿f as the enforcement level of H under the FDI strat-
egy. As explored in the previous literature8, it is natural to assume that
￿f > ￿s, since integration generates a stronger threat to the manufacturing
sector under the bargaining process. Moreover, as examined in the previ-
ous section, we assume that ￿f > ￿s, since ￿nal-good producers may have
stronger power in capturing the pro￿t of the manufacturing sector. From
the de￿nition of ￿, @￿=@￿ > 0 when ￿ is su¢ ciently high and @￿=@￿ > 0.
Moreover, K is an increasing function of ￿. Hence, provided that the sector
under consideration is headquarter- intensive, that is, ￿ is su¢ ciently high,
we can derive that
￿s < ￿f; (42)
Ks < Kf: (43)
We can easily obtain that under low enforcement levels, ￿s < ￿f < ￿n
and Ks < Kf < Kn. Therefore, low productivity ￿rms choose outsourcing
in the South and middle productivity ￿rms choose FDI and high productivity
￿rms choose integration in the North. This situation is consistent with
Grossman and Helpman (2004). On the other hand, if the enforcement level
in the South is su¢ ciently high, then ￿n < ￿s < ￿f and Kn < Ks <
Kf. Hence, low productivity ￿rms choose integration in the North, middle
productivity ￿rms choose outsourcing in the South and high productivity
￿rms choose FDI. This situation is consistent with the argument of Antr￿s
and Helpman (2004). The results are summarized in Figure 5.
Once again, we should stress that we have derived the above situations
with the assumption that the ￿xed cost does not varies with organization
structure. Even if the total ￿xed cost is irrelevant to the organization and its
location choices, several types of organization structures should be chosen.
This point is important for understanding the FDI choice. Under the ar-
gument of Antr￿s and Helpman (2004), the di⁄erence in ￿xed cost between
FDI and outsourcing in the South is crucial for the argument of Antr￿s and
Helpman (2004).
Our argument is consistent with the empirical ￿nding by Chor et al.
(2007), which examined the relation between the ￿nancial condition of a host
8For example, Antr￿s (2003) and Antr￿s and Helpman (2004).
20country and the decisions to undertake FDI. Chor et al. (2007) have shown
that ￿stronger ￿nancial development in the host country has a negative
e⁄ect on the share of MNC a¢ liate sales that remain in the host country.￿
Our argument has also shown that ￿rms that had chosen the FDI strategy
previously may change to the integration strategy or outsourcing strategy if
the enforcement level in the ￿nancial market has improved.
7 Conclusion and Extension
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the optimal mode of organization
is crucially dependent upon the ￿nancial market condition of the host coun-
try. If the ￿nancial market of the host country is not too developed and the
enforcement level is low, only the ￿nal-good producers whose productivity
is low choose outsourcing in the South. On the other hand, if the ￿nancial
market is developed and the enforcement level is high, only the ￿nal-good
producers whose productivity level is high choose outsourcing in the South.
This result can solve the puzzle which was pointed out by Antr￿s and Help-
man (2004). We have also shown that the empirical results cited by Antr￿s
and Helpman (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2004) are not inconsis-
tent. The mode of organization varies depending upon the condition of the
￿nancial market in the host country.
By extending the above result, we will able to obtain several implications
about product cycle arguments. For example, the question arises, quite nat-
urally, as to why outsourcing is gaining popularity in the world economy,
even though the wage rates of the South countries are rising gradually. It
is di¢ cult to answer this question on the basis of the argument in Antr￿s
and Helpman(2004). In their model, the range of outsourcing should de-
crease when wage rate in the South increases. By using the above result,
we can answer the question. If both the wage rate and enforcement level
increase in the South, the range of outsourcing should expand; moreover,
high productivity ￿rms choose the outsourcing strategy.
Let us take the example of a developing country. In the beginning, the
￿nancial market of this country is quite immature, and the enforcement
mechanism does not work well. Under the development process, the legal
mechanisms pertaining to the ￿nancial market is developed and the enforce-
ment level is increased. Hence, if the enforcement level and the wage rate
of the south country have improved, the situation moves from the one illus-
trated in Figure 1 to the one illustrated in Figure 2. This suggests that high
productivity ￿rms will choose outsourcing in the South. In other words, this
21argument demonstrates that it is important to examine the change in wage
rate and change of market imperfections of the South.
The results of this paper establish that even considering outsourcing or
FDI decisions, we should be concerned with the conditions of the ￿nancial
markets of the host countries, particularly those pertaining to the conditions
of institutional quality or enforcement levels. Recently, the importance of
institutional aspects has been stressed in several papers (for example, Nunn,
2007; Bernard et al., 2008; Yeaple and Golub, 2007; Levchenko, 2007; and
Chor et al., 2007). However, those papers do not focus on outsourcing deci-
sions intensively. The results of this paper suggest that careful examinations
of the relation between ￿rms￿productivity levels and enforcement level in
each host country are important for an in-depth understanding of outsourc-
ing and FDI decisions.
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